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Abstract
We study a simple inuence game, in which a lobby tries to manipulate the decision of a
legislature via monetary o¤ers to one or more members. We compute the minimum budget
needed for the lobby to pass the bill and the distribution of this budget between the legislators.
We also show the connection of the problem to the combinatorial optimization.
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1 Introduction
The aim of this note is to analyze how the complexity of legislative process shapes the special interest
politics. To do so we consider a simple inuence game, in which a single lobby tries to manipulate
the decision of a legislature by making monetary o¤ers to one or more members. Clearly, making
contribution to a single legislator (as soon as he/she does not have the veto power) does not guarantee
the award of lobbyists preferred policy. We calculate the minimum budget the lobby needs to secure
the required support as well as the distribution of this budget between the legislators. We demonstrate
the connection of the problem with the knapsack problem from combinatorial optimization. Similar
questions are studied in Young (1978). However, contrary to this note, in Young (1978) the problem is
considered from the legislatorspoint of view as they maximize the bribeincome while the lobbyist is
the price-taker. As a result, at equilibrium the legislators may get strictly more than their reservation
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prices while this can never happen in our setting. The expected incomes of the legislators are then
compared to the well-known power measures.
2 Model
The legislature is described by a simple game, i.e., a pair (N;W) where N = f1; 2; :::; ng is the set of
legislators and W is the set of winning coalitions. The set of winning coalitions describes the rules
operating in the legislature to make decisions. The legislature can ratify or reject a given proposal.
A proposal is ratied if and only if the subset of legislators voting in favor of the proposal forms a
winning coalition. A coalition C is blocking if NnC is not winning. We denote by B the subset of
blocking coalitions. The status quo is maintained as soon as the set of legislators voting against the
proposal forms a blocking coalition. The set of minimal (with respect to inclusion) winning coalitions
is denoted by Wm. Similarly, the set of minimal blocking coalitions is denoted by Bm.
Following Young (1978) we assume that there is a minimum price i  0 (oor price) the legislator
i accepts as a contribution from the lobby. We denote by pi  0 the equilibrium price of legislator i.
We assume that the lobbyist has a large amount of funds at his disposal and would like to pass the
bill at the lowest cost. In the following section we calculate the prices for individual legislators that
minimize the total cost
P
i2N pi the lobbyist pays to pass the decision.
3 Equilibrium analysis
In order to pass the bill the lobby has to buy the support of a winning coalition. Let us denote it by
S, then for each i 2 S
pi  i.
As the lobby would like to buy the support at the lowest costs, the minimum amount the lobby should
pay to legislator i 2 S voting in favor of the bill is1
pi = i.
Note, that contrary to Young (1978), the legislators never get more than their oor prices.
1We assume that a legislator who is indi¤erent votes for the bill.
2
The problem of the lobbyist is to nd S 2 Wm for which the total contribution is minimal2
min
S2Wm
X
i2S
i. (1)
The legislators j =2 S do not get any o¤ers from the lobbyist, i.e., pj = 0.
Remark. One may notice that if all i are identical, problem (1) is equivalent to identifying the
minimal winning coalition of the smallest size:
min
S2Wm
jSj ,
where jSj is the size of coalition S.
3.1 The Knapsack Problem
Suppose that the game (N;W) is a weighted majority game, i.e., there exists an n-tuple w = (w1; :::; wn)
of non-negative weights with
P
i2N wi = 1 and quota q  0 such that any S 2 W if and only ifP
i2S wi  q. Then, the problem of nding S can be formulated as the combinatorial problem called
a knapsack problem (e.g., Pisinger, 1995 and Kellerer et al., 2004):
min
zi
nP
i=1
izi
subject to the constraints
nP
i=1
wizi  q
zi 2 f0; 1g :
In this formulation we refer to packing of n items into a knapsack. Each object i = 1; ::; n is charac-
terized by a pair (wi; i), where i is the weight and wi is the value of object i. Integer zi indicates
whether the object i is included in the knapsack (zi = 1) or not (zi = 0). The objective is to minimize
the total weight of the knapsack
nP
i=1
izi while maintaining the total value
nP
i=1
wizi above the threshold
q.
There is strong theoretical evidence that for the knapsack problem no polynomial time algorithm
exists for computing its optimal solution (e.g., Kellerer et al., 2004). In fact, the knapsack problem
belongs to a class of so-called NP-hard optimization problems, for which there does not exist any
polynomial time algorithm to nd an optimal solution. However, if we consider the linear relaxation
2The problem can be reformulated if the lobbyist is willing to block the bill instead of seeking to pass it. Then we
substitue S 2 Wm for T  2 Bm.
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zi 2 [0; 1] for all i = 1; :::; n;
things become simpler. Indeed, let us consider the impact of a small change (dzi; dzj) leaving the
constraint unchanged, i.e., such that widzi + wldzl = 0. The change in the objective is equal to
idzi + jdzj = dziwi

i
wi
  j
wj

:
For i
wi
> i
wl
the change is positive if dzi is positive and negative otherwise. This suggests the following
optimal solution. Order the numbers

i
wi

1in
in increasing order. Let  be that order. Then, dene
z(i) = 1 for all i = 1; ::; i   1
and
z(i) = q  
i 1X
i=1
w(i)z(i);
where
i = inf
1in
(
i :
i 1X
i=1
w(i)z(i)  q
)
:
This algorithm, called greedy algorithm, is simple but its performance under the integer constraints
is not clear. Thus, Kellerer et al. (2004) show that greedy solutions can be arbitrary bad as compared
to the optimal solution. Of course, for small n one can nd the solution by elementary checking as we
illustrate in the examples below.
The problem has a straightforward solution in the symmetric case, when wi = 1 for all i = 1; :::; n.
Suppose for simplicity that 1  2  :::n. In such a case:
zi =
8<: 1 if i = 1; 2; :::; q;0 otherwise.
In general, the determination of a closed-form solution may be complicated because of the trade-o¤
between the voting weight wi of player i and his reservation price i.
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4 Examples
Let us demonstrate the solution of problem (1) for some important voting bodies.
Example 1: EU Council of Ministers (1958 - 1972). In that period the Council consisted of
representatives from six countries. The three bigcountries (Germany, Italy and France) held four
votes each, the two mediumcountries (Belgium and the Netherlands) held two votes each and the
littlecountry (Luxembourg) held one vote. A qualied majority was set at 12 out of 17, i.e., passing
a decision required at least 12 votes in favor of the decision.
There are two types of minimal winning coalitions in this case: three big countries or two big
countries together with two medium ones. There is one coalition of the rst type and six coalitions of
the second. Luxembourg is never a part of a minimum winning coalition.
One can conclude from the Remark that if all oor prices are equal to 1 then S = f1; 2; 3g and
the total cost paid by the lobbyist is 3.
Assume that the weights of three big countries are 1  2  3 and the weights of two medium
countries are 4 and 5. Then, the coalition S is dened as
S =
8<: f1; 2; 3g if 3  4 + 5f1; 2; 4; 5g otherwise :
As a result, the minimum cost paid by the lobbyist is dened as
X
i2S
i =
8<: 1 + 2 + 3 if 3  4 + 51 + 2 + 4 + 5 otherwise :
Example 2: The U.S. Federal Legislative System.
The members of the House of Representatives (R) and the Senate (S), together with the Vice-
President (V) and the President (P) are the players in this voting game. A coalition is winning if it
contains either more than half the house and more than half the senate (with the vice president playing
the role of tie-breaker in the senate), together with the support of the president or two-thirds of both
the house and the senate (to override a veto by the president): f218R; 50S; V; Pg ; f218R; 51S; Pg ;
f290R; 67Sg3.
Following Example 7 (Young, 1978), we assume that all the oor prices are equal to 1. Then,
the rst two winning coalitions are the cheapest and the minimal total cost is 270. Suppose R =
3This game cannot be represented as a weighted majority game (e.g.,Young, 1978).
5
S = V = 1 and P = 88 (the equilibrium prices obtained in the example), then the three coalitions
become equally costly and the total cost incurred by the lobbyist is 357.
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